Why shared admin access goes wrong
Nobody plans to have seven administrators. Accounts accumulate because Administrator is the only role that reliably "just works", and because removing access feels ruder than granting it. The trouble is what the role includes. Every administrator can install code, create other administrators, change where password resets are sent, and edit theme files in the browser.
WordPress records almost none of that. Revisions name who saved a post. Nothing names who deactivated a plugin, changed a setting or promoted an account. So when the site breaks on a Friday, the investigation is a group chat.
Start with the parts WordPress can enforce
- One named account per person. A shared "admin" or "agency" login makes every other measure on this page worthless.
- The lowest role that does the job. Most content people need Editor. Most SEO work needs Editor plus the SEO plugin's own manager role. Keep Administrator for the people who maintain the site.
- Switch off the file editor with define( 'DISALLOW_FILE_EDIT', true ); in wp-config.php. Code changes then have to go through a deploy.
- Two-factor authentication for every administrator.
- An end date for contractors. Put the offboarding date in the calendar on the day you create the account.
A change routine light enough to survive
Formal change control fails on small teams because it costs more than the changes do. Three habits cover most of the benefit:
- Say it before you do it. One line in the team channel: "updating WooCommerce on production at 14:00". It takes ten seconds and removes most surprises.
- Plugins, themes and settings on staging first when the site earns money.
- A weekly look at what actually changed, compared against what was announced. This is the step that needs a record.
The record: what changed, whether or not anyone announced it
Who Changed It writes down each administrative change as it happens, with the user, the IP address and the old and new values. For a shared site the useful part is what it does with them:
- The dangerous changes reach you immediately. A new administrator account, a role raised to administrator, use of the file editor, a changed admin email or site address: each is flagged dangerous and sent by email, Slack, Discord or Telegram.
- Unusual context is escalated with the reason written out. A sign-in at 03:00, or from an address that account has never used, or a burst of deletions by one person.
- Automation is distinguishable. An auto-update or a cron job has no logged-in user, and the row says so. That clears your colleagues before anyone has to ask.
- The weekly review writes itself. The digest lists every flagged event and the most frequent event types, and arrives even in a quiet week.
#2207 · 16:41 · seo-contractor · user_role_changed · m.lang: editor → administrator — dangerous
Contractors and freelancers
A log changes the contractor relationship in both directions. You can see what was done under the account you paid for, and the contractor can show that the thing that broke was not theirs. Tell them the log exists when you hand over the login. It is fairer, in the EU it is generally required, and people are more careful when they know changes are attributed.
At the end of the engagement, filter the log to their account, export it, and keep the file with the invoice. Then delete or downgrade the account. Removing a user does not remove their history; the rows stay under the username they were recorded with.
Who watches the watchers
On a shared site, some of the people in the log are the same people who could edit it. Three settings deal with that:
- Reading the log is a separate capability. Grant whochita_view_log to a site owner who is not an administrator, or use the mode in which administrators have no access unless granted.
- Settings can be pinned to one account. Other administrators then cannot mute events, shorten retention or purge.
- The log is hash-chained. A row removed directly from the database is reported at the next verification. How that works.
Changes to the plugin's own settings, purges and redactions are themselves logged and cannot be muted.
What a log does not fix
It will not stop a bad change, approve a good one, or undo anything. It cannot see edits made over SFTP or directly in the database. And it does not replace the conversation about who should have Administrator at all. It makes that conversation shorter, because you can look at what each account has actually done in the last ninety days.
Common questions
How do I see which admin changed something in WordPress?
WordPress only records this for content, through revisions. For plugins, themes, settings, users and roles you need an activity log installed before the change happens. Who Changed It records each of those with the user, the IP address and the old and new values.
How many administrators should a WordPress site have?
As few as the maintenance needs, and each one a named individual. Most content and SEO work can be done as Editor. Every administrator can install code and create further administrators, so each extra account is a larger risk than it looks.
How do I keep track of what a freelancer changed on my site?
Give the freelancer their own account, tell them activity is logged, and review the log filtered to that account. At the end of the work, export that history and remove or downgrade the account. The log entries remain after the user is deleted.
Can another administrator delete or edit the activity log?
They can try. Settings can be restricted to a single account so others cannot purge or mute, and purges are logged as dangerous events that cannot be muted. Rows removed directly from the database break the hash chain and are reported on the next verification.
Do I have to tell staff and contractors that their changes are logged?
In the EU, generally yes: transparency is part of processing their data lawfully, and some countries add employment-law requirements such as works-council consultation. Outside the EU it is still good practice. Telling people also tends to make them more careful.