Who Changed It/Compliance
An activity log is personal data about your own staff and contractors. That is not a reason to go without one. It is a reason to pick one that limits what it keeps, deletes on schedule, and can answer an erasure request without destroying the record.
Article 32 expects you to be able to detect and investigate security incidents, and Article 33 gives you 72 hours to notify a breach once you know about it. Both are hard without a record of who did what. Yet that record names people, stores their IP addresses and describes their working day, which puts it squarely under Article 5: collect no more than you need, and keep it no longer than you need it.
Most WordPress activity logs settle this by ignoring one side. They keep everything indefinitely, or they offer a delete button that removes the evidence along with the personal data. Who Changed It was built on the assumption that you need both halves.
Security logging is usually based on Article 6(1)(f), legitimate interest. Recital 49 names network and information security as such an interest. The basis is not automatic, though. It depends on a balancing test, and the balance tips your way when the logging is proportionate, limited in time, and open to the people being logged. The plugin gives you a setting for each of those, and you still have to write the assessment yourself. The step-by-step GDPR guide has a worked example.
| GDPR provision | What the plugin does | What stays with you |
|---|---|---|
| Data minimisation, Art. 5(1)(c) | Four IP modes: full, masked (/24 for IPv4, /48 for IPv6), keyed hash, or not stored. Individual event types can be muted. Gateway secrets and AI connector keys are never read. | Choosing the mode. Hashing or dropping IPs switches off the new-IP and brute-force rules. |
| Storage limitation, Art. 5(1)(e) | Automatic deletion after three months by default, with a separate window for each of the ten event families. | Deciding the windows and writing down why. |
| Right of access, Art. 15 | Registers with WordPress's Export Personal Data tool, so a request handled the standard way includes the log. | Verifying the requester and reviewing the export for other people's data. |
| Right to erasure, Art. 17 | Registers with Erase Personal Data. Rows are redacted, not deleted: personal fields are replaced, a redaction time is stamped, and the action is itself logged. | Deciding whether erasure applies at all. Art. 17(3)(e) can exempt records needed for legal claims. |
| Security of processing, Art. 32 | Reading the log is its own capability. Records are hash-chained, so an altered or deleted row is detected. | Protecting the database and its backups. |
| Transfers and processors, Art. 28 and 44 | The log stays in your own database. A default install makes no outbound requests. | Slack, Discord and Telegram alerts, if you switch them on, send event summaries to those services. |
This is the part most logs get wrong. A row such as "administrator A deleted user B's account" is B's personal data and, at the same time, the accountability record for A. Deleting it to satisfy B erases the evidence of what A did.
Who Changed It redacts instead. The row keeps its place, B's username, IP and personal context fields are replaced with a placeholder, and a log_redacted event records who carried out the erasure. The hash that sealed the row still commits to what it originally said, so the chain verifies across the redaction and the history around it stays provable.
#8841 · 10:02 · [redacted] · user_login · redacted 2026-09-14 — chain intact
Retention purges work on the same principle. Deleted spans are recorded as authorised gaps, so routine pruning never reads as tampering.
IP addresses are personal data. The four modes are a real choice with a real trade:
A button applies masking to everything already recorded, for when the policy changes after the fact. If you hash or drop, say so in your privacy notice. It is a reassurance that costs nothing to state.
If the people in the log are your employees, data protection law is only half the picture. Article 88 lets member states set stricter rules for employment, and many have. In Germany, for instance, a system able to monitor staff behaviour generally needs works-council agreement before it is switched on. Almost everywhere in the EU, the minimum is transparency: tell people the log exists, what it records, how long it is kept and who can read it.
Two settings help you keep that promise. Log access can be limited to named roles, to the point where administrators cannot read it unless granted. And the log records administrative actions only. It does not track page views, keystrokes, time on task, or anything your visitors and customers do.
The plugin does not write your legitimate interest assessment, your record of processing under Article 30, or your privacy notice. It does not decide whether an erasure request should be honoured. It cannot see changes made outside WordPress, such as direct database edits. And it makes no site compliant: it removes the technical obstacles so that the decisions left are the ones that were always yours.