Who Changed It/Answers
Spam pages, a redirect to a site you've never heard of, an administrator you didn't create. Before you can clean up, you need to know what the attacker changed and how they got in. This page walks through where to look, in order.
The instinct is to restore last week's backup and move on. Don't do that first. A restore wipes out the evidence of how the attacker got in, and if that way in is still open, whether it's a vulnerable plugin or a stolen password, they will be back within days.
Attackers change a small number of predictable things. Go through them in this order. The first two are quick, and they are where most break-ins show up.
Filter Users by Administrator and question every account. Attackers create admin accounts with plausible names ("wpadmin", "support", a copy of a real name) or quietly promote an existing low-level account. With WP-CLI: wp user list --role=administrator. Check the email addresses too. An attacker may change a real admin's email so that password resets go to them.
Look for plugins you don't recognise, including ones that are deactivated, which can still hold a backdoor file anyone can reach by URL. Then check the Must-Use tab on the Plugins screen, or the wp-content/mu-plugins folder: code there runs on every request, can't be switched off from the dashboard, and is easy to miss.
Compare your files with the official versions:
Checksums only cover files that have an official copy to compare against. For everything else (uploads, premium plugins, your own theme) scan the files for known webshells and injected code. WPSniffer, a free, open-source command-line malware scanner from this site's author, checks a WordPress tree against community YARA rules over SSH, and doesn't need WordPress to be running: wpsniffer malware-scan /var/www/html. Its guide to finding PHP webshells in wp-content/uploads goes through that folder in detail.
A handful of settings let an attacker take the site over without touching a file. Check Settings → General: the WordPress and site address (redirecting all your visitors), the admin email (receiving your password resets), "Anyone can register" and the default role (handing out accounts). On a shop, check the payment settings, because redirecting payouts is one of the most lucrative things an attacker can do to a WooCommerce site.
Injected spam and redirect scripts often live in the database rather than in files. Search post content and the options table for <script, eval(, base64_decode and domains you don't recognise. Look for published posts and pages you didn't write, especially large batches of them.
A well-hidden infection reinstalls itself. wp cron event list shows every scheduled job: look for hooks you can't match to a plugin you use. If you clean everything else but miss this, the site is reinfected on the next cron run.
Your host's access logs are the best evidence of the entry point, if they still exist. Many hosts keep them only for days. Look for bursts of POST requests to wp-login.php or xmlrpc.php (password guessing), requests to PHP files that shouldn't exist, and requests to a specific plugin's folder just before the first sign of trouble, which points at a vulnerability in that plugin.
Everything above is reconstruction. WordPress doesn't record who created a user, changed a role, installed a plugin or edited a setting. It stores the current state and overwrites the past. And the attacker has every reason to tidy up after themselves: delete the account they used, remove the plugin they installed, clear whatever log they can find. If an activity log was running but stored its records in an ordinary database table, anyone with admin or database access could delete the rows that mention them, and nothing about the remaining table would look wrong.
Who Changed It is built for exactly this situation. It records the events a break-in consists of, and it's designed so that covering them up leaves a trace.
#60114 · 02:47 · no user · user_created · "wp-support" (administrator) — new administrator account — dangerous, alert sent
Being clear about the limits matters most on a page like this. Who Changed It records what passes through WordPress. It does not scan files for malware, and it can't see a file uploaded over FTP, a webshell written through a vulnerability that never goes through WordPress's own functions, or a row inserted straight into the database. An attacker with full control of the server can switch it off. That's why the alerts go out immediately and why a missing digest is meaningful. It doesn't replace backups, file integrity checks or a firewall. The files are the other half of the picture, and the half WPSniffer covers: an open-source alternative to Wordfence CLI by the same author, with no account or licence key. Who Changed It is the record that tells you what happened in WordPress and lets you prove the record is intact.
If you'd rather hand the cleanup to someone else, finding the entry point, removing what was left behind and hardening the site is incident work. Malware removal and hardening is the service run by this site's own author.